Analyzing Foreign Policy Crises in Turkey
Analyzing Foreign Policy Crises in Turkey:  

*Conceptual, Theoretical and Practical Discussions*

Edited by  
Fuat Aksu and Helin Sarı Ertem
This book is dedicated to:

**NURETTİN AKSU,**
*missing you, your curious questions and encouraging comments...*

and

**MELİH MURAT ERTEM,**
*thank you for your inspiring ideas and generous support...*
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In alphabetical order.
This book resulted from a three-year long TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) Project, examining the Turkish foreign policy crises and crisis management strategies in the Republican Era. The project, which received remarkable interest in Turkish academia, allowed us to examine 34 foreign policy crises in the last 92 years since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. It is worth underlining here that the brainstorming in our “Coercive Diplomacy and Crisis Management in Turkish Foreign Policy” course made a valuable contribution to the embodiment of this project. Colleagues and students, who encouraged us for a much comprehensive study of this critical issue, believed in the necessity of making it a book and gave their kind support by writing the chapters of it.

This book requires us to thank not only these esteemed contributors, but many other names and institutions. Among them, TÜBİTAK and Yıldız Technical University, Scientific Research Projects Coordinatorship (YTU - BAPK), deserve our special thanks for the academic and financial assistance they gave to this project. We would also like to thank the participants/staff officers of the Turkish War Colleges, The Armed Forces Higher Command and Management College, which made eye-opening contributions during our discussions there especially on the military decision making processes of the Turkish crisis management.

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Finally, our special thanks goes to our family members, especially our spouses and children, without whose love and patience this book would not be finished. We would also like to commemorate dear Nurettin Aksu,
whom we lost during the preparation of this book. His loving-kindness and support for his children and grandchildren will never be forgotten.

We hope this book can inspire further academic studies in the area of foreign policy crises.

Fuat Aksu and Helin Sari Ertem
Istanbul, November 2016
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democrat Party <em>(Demokrat Parti)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Felicity Party <em>(Saadet Partisi)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>Flight Information Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston or National Organization of Greek Cypriot Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>Free Syrian Army</td>
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<td>GCA</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot Administration</td>
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<td>GUP</td>
<td>Great Union Party</td>
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<td>ICBP</td>
<td>International Crisis Behavior Project</td>
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<td>IHH</td>
<td>The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party <em>(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
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<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
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<td>MIT</td>
<td>Turkish National Intelligence <em>(Milli İstihbarat Teşkilati)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Motherland Party <em>(Anavatan Partisi)</em></td>
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<td>NMP</td>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party <em>(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)</em></td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PYD</td>
<td>Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat or Democratic Union Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party <em>(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>Syrian National Council</td>
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<td>TFPC</td>
<td>Turkish Foreign Policy Crises</td>
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<tr>
<td>THY</td>
<td>Turkish Airlines</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td>Turkish Resistance Organization <em>(Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>TPAO</td>
<td>Turkish Petroleum Corporation <em>(Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı)</em></td>
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<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUBITAK</td>
<td>Technological Research Council of Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>YPG</td>
<td>Yekitina Parastine Gel or People’s Protection Units</td>
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CHAPTER THREE

TURKEY’S PROTRACTED FOREIGN POLICY CONFLICTS: CYPRUS AND AEGEAN CRISIES*

FUAT AKSU AND SÜLEYMAN GÜDER

Introduction

This chapter claims that the concept of a “dispute” refers to a verbal disagreement among different parties on a certain issue. Conflict, on the other hand, refers to the phase in which any of the parties of a dispute carries the verbal dispute to such a level that involves action. In other words, a phase of conflict refers to a situation where at least one of the parties defends its views with action with the aim of changing the conditions to its own advantage.

A crisis usually emerges at a perceptual level when the phases of dispute and conflict prove unmanageable. In the process of escalation from a conflict to a crisis, one or all of the parties may take into consideration the options of military violence. Thus appears a process of mutual challenge between the parties. A crisis could, therefore, be defined as a situation that emerges among two parties, includes the risk of the use of military power and compels the decision makers to choose among a limited range of options. For any situation to be considered as a “crisis”, at least one of the parties should have identified it as such. A situation identified as a crisis by one decision-maker bears meaning only for that single state/actor, and such cases are coined as “unilateral crisis”. A foreign policy crisis may be unilateral, as well as bilateral or multilateral.

A variety of definitions of crisis are offered in the academic literature. In Charles F. Hermann’s definition of the concept, the points that need to

* This chapter is supported by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey - TÜBİTAK 1001 Project (Project No: 112K172).
be considered in order to define a situation as a crisis include whether it occurs as a surprise for the decision-maker, whether one or more of the significant goals and targets are threatened, and whether the decision-maker has sufficient time to decide and react to the situation. In other words, whether a situation constitutes a crisis or not is to be decided by considering the features of the threat, time and surprise.\(^1\) Improving on Hermann’s definition, Michael Brecher offers another definition in which Brecher’s conceptualization differs in five aspects:

1) Brecher ignores the surprise character of the situation,
2) posits that the decision-maker has limited time, instead of short time,
3) admits that the situation inducing the crisis could originate in the internal environment of the decision-maker, as well as the external environment,
4) defines the target of the perceived threat as the “basic values” of the decision-maker, rather than the “high priority” goals,
5) requires that the level of military enmity in the relations among the parties should be observed to have escalated during the crisis.\(^2\)

The flexibility that Brecher introduced to the definition of crisis facilitates our explanation of the consideration regarding the perception-based actions of the decision-makers in foreign policy crises. Indeed, when we set out with numerous empirical data in the analyses of crisis, whether the situation occurs as a surprise seems to lose its importance in the definition of the crisis. Particularly with the consideration that crises can also be pre-designed, the element of surprise disappears at least for the designing party. In many cases, furthermore, warnings pointing at the crisis are already present in the phase preceding the crisis –if we are not talking about a sudden crisis due to a real accident or escalation of crisis. A definition including the element of surprise would, therefore, make a narrowing impact in classifying crises. The contemporary intensity, advancement and depth of communication, intelligence and information flow among the actors, moreover, make it very difficult for any event to remain secret.


On the other hand, due to its perceptual nature, it is possible for the decision-maker to perceive a crisis when perception of the threat is towards basic values and priorities, instead of high-priority goals. Yet, this definition still requires elaboration. The definition of crisis should be improved, particularly with regard to the existence of an abnormal increase in the level of military enmity. In foreign policy crises, the action that triggers a crisis may have been supported by instruments and methods that do not include military violence. The crisis may be seen by the decision-makers as a concrete attack towards basic values and priorities, and still there may be no military challenge. In such a case, even when a military challenge is not observed, a political challenge may exist.\(^3\) A higher than normal increase in the level of military enmity constitutes, therefore, a significant indicator that decision-makers should consider in military-security crises.

If the decision-makers are compelled to make a choice among existent alternatives at a moment they did not desire or were not prepared for, with regard to considering the internal/external impact of the decision they would make, they may define the situation as a crisis.

Accordingly, the event considered as the trigger of the crisis:

- May arise in any issue that would occupy the foreign policy agenda of the decision-maker;
- May arise suddenly as well as developing over a certain time period;
- May force the decision-makers for a change in their perception and/or reality, or in basic values and priorities;
- May be perceived by the decision-makers as risk, danger, threat or attack;
- Due to this perceptual situation, the decision-makers must make a decision or choose among a limited range of options available;
- The decision made has the potential to lead to a military collision or war with the actor(s) directly addressed, although such situations do not always end up in war.

\(^3\) The 1926-1927 Bozkurt-Lotus crisis, one of the foreign policy crises of Turkey, is such an example. As a newly established state sensitive on the issue of legal capitulations, Turkey considered the questioning of its jurisdiction as a threat to its basic values and priorities, and defined the situation that emerged in its relations with France as a crisis. This was not accompanied, however, with an increase in the level of military hostility in the bilateral relations. As the mandatory to Syria, France was a neighbor of Turkey and the two countries were parties to an unresolved border issue related to Hatay (The Sanjak of Alexandretta).
Turkey’s Protracted Foreign Policy Conflicts

Crises may also be examined at different levels, as is done by Charles F. Hermann and Michael Brecher. With an actor-based classification, they may be divided into foreign policy crises and international crises. In crisis management studies, the level of crisis is also considered as a significant component of analysis. Analyzing crises on two different levels, a classification based on the parties of crises may produce two categories: The first includes actor-level foreign policy crises emerging among states; while the second includes system-level crises, also coined as international crises.

In foreign policy crises, at least one of the parties is a state. In international crises however, even though at least one of the parties is a state, the crisis is more complicated as it impacts directly or indirectly on a host of states and organizations. It is always possible, on the other hand, for a foreign policy crisis to evolve into an international one, although this is a relatively small possibility. Whether foreign policy or international, in temporal terms crises may erupt and subside suddenly, yet they may be re-triggered by a speech or action. This latter type of crisis bears the signs of a long-lasting dispute or conflict, which we call as a protracted conflict.

Protracted conflicts spread over long periods of time, escalating as well as halting occasionally in terms of tension and violence. This kind of conflicts, therefore, constitutes a process rather than specific, irregularly arising and repeating events. Besides, long-lasting and protracted conflicts carry the potential to include military violence, and develop into crises and, ultimately, war. Still, protracted conflicts do not necessarily involve violence in each case.4

According to Brecher, the following features are observed in crises emerging within protracted conflicts:5

- The statement, action or situation triggering the crisis has the potential for high level of violence;
- There is high possibility of threat towards high-priority values;
- There is high possibility for violence in crisis management.

In non-protracted conflicts, on the other hand, there is lower possibility for these features to be observed.

5 Brecher, *International Political …*, 29.
Figure 3.1. Crises within Protracted Conflicts

The relations between Turkey and Greece are among the cases Brecher examines in his comprehensive work on protracted conflicts. In his analysis of the conflictual issues between Turkey and Greece, Brecher traces the roots of the “conflictual” character of the relationship back to the 19th century when Greece gained its independence, or even to the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans in 1453. He emphasizes the aftermath of the establishment of the Greek state following the struggle for independence against the Ottoman State, since when the two parties have confronted each other and made wars over and over. Through the general course of the relations in the period of 1821-2015, the Republic of Turkey replaced the Ottoman State as of 1923. A change of course was observed in Turkey-Greece relations starting with the Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923. The treaty is a political document that “establishes a status quo and balance” among the parties. The Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed at the end of the First World War and is still in force. Yet it could not prevent the emergence of new areas of dispute in bilateral relations, while there have also been differences of opinion or breaches in the interpretation of the status that the treaty established.

When speaking of “parties” throughout the chapter, the relations between the two nation-states will be taken into consideration, and the imperial era preceding the Republic will be left out. The focus will be, therefore, on the conflicts-crises that emerged out of the disputes related to the breach and/or insufficiency of the status defined by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. These disputes can be classified into three main categories: disputes related to the minorities; disputes regarding the Aegean Sea; and Cyprus. Throughout the history of Turkish-Greek relations, each dispute category has served, at different times, as the source of a conflictual relationship and produced crises. The analysis of Turkey-Greece relationship has been the subject of numerous studies. This chapter will discuss how these disputes evolve into crises, within the framework of the concept of protracted conflicts. The cases of foreign policy crises to be discussed are based on the data we have acquired in our project on foreign policy crisis in which Turkey has taken part. A total of 34 foreign policy

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6 For a detailed study on crises, see Brecher ve Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*..., 7, 361-374; Brecher, *International Political* ..., 17, 29.


8 For detailed information about the project, see “Türkiye’de Dış Politika Krizlerinde Karar Verme ve Kriz Yönetimi Sürec Analizi” (Analysis of Decision
crises have been found, that Turkey has been a part of throughout the Republican era until 2015. In 14 of these crises, Greece and Cyprus were directly and/or indirectly involved.\(^9\)

Three of the crises listed by Brecher occurred in the 1920-1922 period, thus they precede the Republic. Considering the post-1923 period, Brecher examines 3 crises related to the Aegean Sea, and 3 crises related to Cyprus. We consider that the other Turkey-Greek crises we studied in the project should also be considered within the framework of protracted conflicts. In accordance with our definition of crisis, it appears that it is not only the Aegean and Cyprus disputes that produce crisis, but also the disputes related to the minorities. In the light of this, we observe that – from the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty until today- practices and claims related to the status of minorities have provided a source of dispute-conflict between Turkey and Greece, with the exception of short intervals. The minorities issue between the two countries is considered within the context of protracted conflicts. Even though the speech or action triggering the crisis during the 6-7 September 1955 events or the 1984-1990 Western Thrace events included non-military violence, the parties did not consider the situation in these crises as a threat towards their high-priority values, and they did not include the option of violence or military violence in their crisis management strategies. Looking at the crises between Turkey and Greece in the light of Brecher’s evaluation, the parties apparently detect a low level of threat in the crises emerging as part of the conflicts related to the status of minorities. That is why the possibility of use of military violence has always been low in these crises, as the parties preferred to manage them through political strategies.

Considering the evolution of the Cyprus dispute, on the other hand, the 1997 S-300 Missiles Crisis should be included in the list, as a development that could unilaterally alter the balance of military power on the island in the post-1974 period and disrupt the terms of the ceasefire. During that crisis, Turkey prevented the disruption of the status quo by employing the

\(^9\) In the period covered by the ICB project, Brecher detects 9 foreign policy crises between Turkey and Greece. The crises of the 1919-1922 period of war are also included among these. Brecher considers the landing of Greek troops in Izmir as the trigger of the first crisis, the spread of the invasion into Anatolia as the trigger of the second, and the recapture of Izmir by the Turks as the trigger of the third. On this issue, see Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis...*,361-366. Greece is also an indirect party in the 1997 S-300 Missiles Crisis, the 1998 Syria-Ocalan Crisis and the 2010 East Mediterranean EEZ Crisis.
strategy of coercive diplomacy. Due to the establishment of military cooperation and the Common Defence Doctrine between Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, Greece has been indirectly involved as a party to the crisis. Greece is also a signatory to the 1959-1960 founding treaties and has the status of guarantor state.

Figure 3.2. Turkey-Greece Foreign Policy Crises in Protracted Conflicts (1923-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protracted Conflicts</th>
<th>TURKEY - GREECE (1923-)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crises in Protracted Conflicts (Non-military Violent)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1955 6-7 September Crisis</td>
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<td>1974-1976 Aegean Crisis I</td>
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<td>1974-1980 NOTAM – FIR Crisis</td>
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<td>1981 Limni Crisis</td>
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<td>1989-1990 Western Thrace Crisis</td>
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<td>1994-1995 Aegean Crisis III</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2003- Eastern Mediterranean EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zones) Crisis *</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Crises in Protracted Conflicts (Threat to Use of Force)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1964 Cyprus Crisis I</td>
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<td>1967 Cyprus Crisis II</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987 Aegean Crisis II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 Kardak – Imia Crisis</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1997 S-300 Missiles Crisis *</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998 Syria - Ocalan Crisis *</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Crises in Protracted Conflicts (Limited War)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1974 Cyprus Crisis III</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


* The cases with * denote those crises in which Greece was indirectly involved.
Greece was also involved –albeit for a short period- in the (PKK- Partiya Karkerén Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers’ Party- leader Abdullah) Öcalan crisis between Turkey and Syria in 1998. In the period following the extradition of Ocalan from Syria, the relations between the two countries became tense as a result of the asylum granted by Greece to Ocalan, and his capture while hiding in the Greek embassy in Kenya. In the process of Ocalan’s trial, the military and political support given to the PKK and Ocalan by Greece reinforced the perception in Turkey that Greece aided secessionist terror.

The level of threat perception has always been high, in contrast, regarding the crisis-triggering statements, actions and/or situations related to the Cyprus and Aegean disputes. As can be seen in the Figure 2 that Turkey employed military use of force or threatened to use military force (coercive diplomacy) in some of these crises, reflecting the perception of high level threat. The resistance to military intervention in the 1974 Cyprus crisis had led to a limited war.

With regard to the foreign policy crises emerging in protracted conflicts, Greece/Cyprus appears to be the party triggering the crisis in most of the cases between Turkey and Greece. There are also cases where Turkey is the triggering state, for instance, in the case of the continental shelf crisis in 1973-74, which was designed by Turkey through creating a de facto situation in the Aegean Sea. In order to impose on Greece the belief it is a rightful party in the sharing of the continental shelf, Turkey engaged in actions by using peaceful-political instruments –such as issuing licenses and sending research vessels to the controversial areas. As the aim was to force the opponent to concede the presence of the issue and to initiate a process of negotiations, the strategy employed was defensive and not aggressive. Thus Turkey acted on a legitimate basis with regard to international law. Indeed, upon Greece’s application to the UN Security Council complaining of Turkey and requesting a temporary injunction, the Council decided on August 24, 1976 that the scientific activities conducted by Turkey did not cause harm for the rights and interests of the coastal countries, and invited the parties to direct negotiations.

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The crisis that erupted in 1955, caused by the attacks on non-Muslim minorities in Istanbul while tripartite negotiations on Cyprus were being conducted in London, was technically an “inadvertent crisis”.\footnote{With regard to the classification of crises, Alexander L. George’s definition for “inadvertent war” provides an explanatory basis here. On this topic, see Alexander L. George, “Introduction to Part Two”, in Alexander L. George (Ed), Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991): 31-35.} It could easily be argued that the support given by the DP (Democrat Party) government in Turkey did not intend to start a crisis. In managing the diplomatic/political process regarding the Cyprus dispute, the decision-makers apparently failed to take all the parameters into consideration and mismanaged the process, in line with Alexander George’s concept of “inadvertent war”. The parades organized by the government to provide popular support for the negotiators went out of control, turning into attacks on minorities and ultimately stranding the government.

Two of the crises within Turkish-Greek relations are “indirect crises”. The immediate party designing the crisis is the Greek Cypriot Government. In describing how and why they designed this crisis, Glafkos Klerides emphasizes the decrease of attention in the international community regarding Cyprus.\footnote{For a detailed account on this, see Niyazi Kızılyürek, Glafkos Klerides: Tarihten Güncelliğe Bir Kıbrıs Yolculuğu, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).} The S-300 Missile Crisis in 1997 was similarly a crisis between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Government, yet Greece was also engaged due to its common defence doctrine/alliance with Greek Cypriots. Turkey’s warning that the missiles in question would be destroyed if they were brought to the island was, for its opponents, a serious challenge that would be highly risky to test. Turkey’s demand was finally met as Greece and Greek Cypriot Government, agreed to deploy the missiles in Crete instead of Cyprus. Turkey’s determination to consider the missiles as a threat to its security and interests had created a deterring effect. The crisis, moreover, should be considered within the protracted conflict framework as defined by Brecher, since it is a part of the Cyprus dispute.

Another case of indirect crisis is the Ocalan-Syria crisis that erupted in 1998 between Turkey and Syria. Turkey’s use of coercive diplomacy strategy, including its threat to use force based on its right to self-defence, made the anticipated effect and Syria expedited Ocalan and other PKK elements. Upon leaving Syria, Ocalan sought refuge and protection in Greece, which led to a confrontation between Turkey and Greece. Turkey’s declaration that it would apply measures similar to those used against Syria in case Greece granted asylum to Ocalan, and that it would
list the country as a supporter of terrorism, indicated a sudden escalation. In response, Greece focused on finding a solution to prevent an actual combat with Turkey, while trying to get rid of Ocalan. When it was finally revealed that Ocalan was given shelter in Greek Embassy in Kenya, the United States intervened and secured Ocalan’s delivery to Turkey with an operation. A military confrontation between the two countries was thus prevented by the US mediation.

During the crisis, severe accusations were raised in the debates among the government, opposition and the bureaucracy in Greece, and the Prime Minister Costas Simitis purged some politicians and bureaucrats on the grounds that they had dragged the country into a hot conflict with Turkey. In the wake of the crisis, Greece engaged in an effort to improve relations with Turkey, as exemplified in the exchange of letters between the ministers of foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{13} From the perspective of crisis analysis, the Ocalan-Syria crisis can be considered as a “reflection crisis” with regard to Turkey-Greece relations. The Greek policy towards Turkey over the whole period since the 1980s was characterized by its explicit or implicit support to anti-Turkey terrorist organizations. Turkey documented this support given by Greece with concrete evidence, while Greece preferred to deny this in each case. Ironically, it was openly expressed by Ocalan himself, in his testimony during the trial in Turkish courts.\textsuperscript{14} This demonstrates that a dispute with regard to Greece’s support for secessionist terrorism was also present in this crisis.

\textbf{The Cyprus Dispute in Turkey-Greece Relations}

Throughout the general course of the bilateral relations, the period 1919-1923 is characterized by a state of war. The Lausanne Peace Treaty is a basic document establishing the regime and \textit{status quo} that observes the balance between the two countries. The period from 1923 to 1950 was relatively calm, in which friendship and cooperation prevailed. The Cyprus issue has a longer history in bilateral relations, compared to the disputes on the Aegean Sea. In that sense, the Cyprus dispute emerged from a unilateral attempt to alter the status quo initially agreed upon by both sides.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, it involves a challenge to the status quo.

\textsuperscript{13} For details, see Ismail Cem, \textit{Türkiye Avrupa Avrasya}, Cilt I, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniv. Yay, 2004).
\textsuperscript{14} For details, see Atilla Uğur, \textit{Abdullah Öcalan’ı Nasıl Sorguladım: İşte Gerçekler}, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011); Savas Kalenderidis, \textit{Öcalan’ın Teslimi}, (İstanbul: Pencere Yay., 2011).
\textsuperscript{15} For details, see:
The Lausanne Peace Treaty is the basic document establishing border issues in the post-World War I Ottoman geography, defining the national borders of modern Turkey. It is not only the borders with Greece, but also with Italy and Britain that were settled by the Lausanne Peace Treaty. The Dodecanese Islands were ceded to Italy, while the British sovereignty over the island of Cyprus was recognized by the signatory states.

The mutual recognition of the borders of sovereignty among the signatory states had created a balance, which was respected until the end of the Second World War. Unilateral attempts to alter this balance in that period were observed in the case of Cyprus. The insurgence in 1931, arising out of opposition to the British sovereignty over the island and demands for union with Greece, was suppressed by the harsh measures of the British administration. The aspiration for enosis (union with Greece) was violently suppressed during the insurgence, only to revive in 1950s.

The transfer of sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands from Italy to Greece in the aftermath of the Second World War led to the arousal of the demand for enosis in Cyprus. It is in the same period that Cyprus became an issue in the bilateral relations of Turkey and Greece. The propagation of enosis that started in the early 1950s was initially considered as part of the domestic affairs of Britain, and Turkey remained relatively silent. In a time when Greece had recently survived a civil war and was healing its wounds, Turkey preferred not to create a new point of contention with Britain, whose support it was seeking for security reasons. It was when Greece, under the pressure from the Orthodox Churches of Cyprus and Greece and enosis supporters, sought to “internationalize” the demands for Cyprus that Turkey started to pay attention to the issue. The associations of Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey and the coverage by the national press were also effective in forming this attention.

As the British sovereignty over Cyprus was already recognized, Turkey did not have any claim over Cyprus. At this stage, Cyprus did not constitute a dispute to be negotiated between Turkey and Greece. Upon realizing the negative impact that coming developments could have on the bilateral relations, the Turkish side warned the Greeks. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu warned his Greek counterpart, saying that Greece’s policy of the union with Cyprus would damage Turkish-Greek relations.

The search for a solution to the Cyprus dispute that started with the London Conferences in 1955 evolved into a process in which the countries in question determined their arguments and expectations, becoming parties
to a long-standing conflict. In the end, the Cyprus dispute has become a part of Turkey-Greece relations with a history of 65 years. The negotiations that started in 1950 ended in 1960, with the foundation of a new state based on the political equality of the two communities living on the island; and giving up on their claims, the parties guaranteed the status of this state. The newly established state acquired UN membership and became a part of the international community. This entity based on the political equality of the two communities living on the island, however, failed to survive. The unilateral attempt led by Archbishop Makarios III to amend the constitution in 1963, and the subsequent attacks on the Turkish community, carried the dispute to a new level. This time, Turkey started to face the “Republic of Cyprus” as a party to the dispute beside Greece. The curious point was that it had eventually become impossible for the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the government of the “Republic of Cyprus” to use their rights and authority. In other words, although the Republic of Cyprus was founded as a partnership regime, one of the partners was not represented in the crisis processes. This situation caused both the communities and the guaranteeing states to become involved in political conflicts, which quickly turned into a crisis.

If we start the period of crises in Turkey-Greece relations with the “Bloody Christmas” attacks in 1963, the course of the crises in the Cyprus dispute should be examined over a 50 year time span. As mentioned before, since 1950, 14 foreign policy crises have erupted between Turkey and Greece. Five of them are directly related to Cyprus. Yet among these crises specific to Cyprus, the Cold War era crises of 1963-1964, 1967 and 1974 have different characteristics compared with the 1997 S-300 Missiles crisis and the 2003 East Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction crisis. The attempts to create a fait accompli or to impose a new status, however, can be observed in the post-1990 crises as well. From a different perspective, the Cyprus crises could be considered as “protracted crises” within the general course of Turkish-Greek relations. Indeed, the dispute emerged in

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16 The 1950-1960 interval was also a period in which both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were engaged in military organization. In response to the attacks by EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston or The Organization for the National Struggle of Cypriots) that was established in early 1950s under the leadership of George Grivas, the Turkish community was initially in disarray until the foundation of the TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı or Turkish Resistance Organization) in 1957. For detailed accounts of the foundation of the two organizations, see Ulvi Keser, Kibris’ta Yeralti Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, (İstanbul: IQ Yay., 2007); Makarios Druşotis, Karanlık Yön: EOKA, (Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yay., 2007).
Turkey’s Protracted Foreign Policy Conflicts

early 1950s and provided a stage for conflictual relations throughout the 1960s, yet turned into crises at three separate periods, with almost identical features in the years between 1960 and 1974. Although each instance of crisis ended with a return to the conflict, the status quo ante that the parties returned to was characterized with erosion and high level of tension, mostly because it was not the status quo anticipated by the founding documents. Moreover, the crisis management and resolution processes or initiatives in each of the 1964-1967, 1967-1974 or post-1974 periods fell short of removing the differences of opinion and interest among the parties.

In the Cyprus related crises that erupted in the post-1990 period, on the other hand, the verbal or physical actions that triggered the crises point at crisis management strategies designed by the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA). In the S-300 Missiles Crisis over the 1997-1999 period, as declared by the then GCA leader Glafkos Klerides, the Greek Cypriot administration had pursued a strategy of fait accompli, designed intentionally at a time when the Cyprus issue was out of the international agenda. When Turkey reacted to the purchase of missiles and declared that those weapons would be destroyed in case they were transported to the Island, the crisis stirred the international/regional affairs agenda, prompting regional and international organizations -such as the UN, NATO and the EU- to pay closer attention to the issue. Turkey succeeded to prevent the transportation of the weapons to the Island through threat of use of force, yet failed to prevent the Cyprus issue to enter once again into the international agenda. The missiles were stored in the island of Crete, while the UN Secretary General’s call for the restart of bi-communal negotiations carried the Cyprus issue to a new stage. These negotiations resulted in the “Annan Plan” that was put to referendum in 2004. Negotiations were occasionally disrupted during the process, with new proposals aiming to continue it.

The 2004 Annan Plan

The Annan Plan, entitled “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem”, which was put to referendum simultaneously in both parts of the Island in 2004, is definitely one of the most significant turning points in the course of the Cyprus problem since the 1950s. The settlement plan prepared as a result of the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, facilitated by the mediation of the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, was the first document presented to the vote of the people in the long history of the Cyprus dispute. The documents that founded the Republic of Cyprus were prepared without full
consent of Cypriots. Moreover they were not enforced through popular vote. For this reason the Annan Plan has a special place in the long history of dispute, conflict and crisis, as the plan was presented to a referendum after long and arduous negotiations. The Turkish Cypriots responded with 64.91% Yes, and the Greek Cypriots rejected it with a No vote of 75.38%. As a result, the plan was rejected, and a settlement of the Cyprus dispute postponed.

The failure of the Annan Plan had some intriguing consequences. The settlement of the Cyprus dispute was defined as a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession to the EU, while the Greek Cypriot Administration was accepted as a full member representing the whole of the Island. By ratifying this membership, the EU caused a contradiction with its own principles of accession, as it accepted GCA’s membership before the resolution of territorial disputes. The Turkish Cypriot Community and Turkey, on the other hand, said “Yes” to the plan, but this did not enable the removal of the isolation and embargo imposed on Cyprus. GCA’s EU membership, moreover, introduced a new dimension of conditionality into Turkey-EU relations. The confrontations in the process of GCA’s inclusion to the Turkey-EU Customs Union legislation created new obstacles in the functioning of the accession negotiation framework document, endangering the screening process.

**Eastern Mediterranean EEZ Crisis**

A second spiral of dispute-crisis that Turkey faced in the case of Cyprus in 2000s is related to the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. As GCA started to sign treaties with other coastal countries on the Mediterranean defining the boundaries of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), issuing international licensing calls in the areas it defined as its EEZ/continental shelf and announcing tenders caused confrontation between Turkey on the one side and GCA, and indirectly Greece, on the other. GCA’s initiatives regarding maritime jurisdiction areas and the strategies it pursued have certain similarities with the strategy pursued by Turkey in the dispute on the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries on the Aegean Sea in 1974-1976. Against the claims on continental shelf articulated by Greece in that period, Turkey pursued a strategy of fait accompli in order to demonstrate its own sovereign rights over the Aegean Sea and to force Greece into negotiations. As part of this strategy, Turkey licensed Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı-TPAO) for conducting seismic research outside its territorial waters, in controversial areas in the Aegean Sea that it claimed as part of its continental shelf. When Greece
reacted, Turkey announced that there had been no delimitation agreement on this sea and that it was ready for negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf. This is how the dispute on the continental shelf boundaries in the Aegean Sea had arisen. Turkey’s basic approach in this process of dispute-conflict-crisis was, however, defensive with its aim being solely to impose on Greece that, as a coastal state, Turkey had sovereignty rights in the Aegean Sea. Turkey achieved the goal it pursued (creating a *fait accompli*) through its strategy.

In a similar vein, the activities that the GCA started in early 2000s were apparently directed towards the same aim of creating a *fait accompli*. While participating, on the one hand, in inter-communal negotiations for a permanent settlement of the Cyprus dispute; GCA was also signing EEZ treaties with Egypt on February 17, 2003, with Lebanon in January 2007 and with Israel on December 17, 2010. Yet this is a controversial issue on many aspects—legal, political, economic and so on. Natural resources and their exploitation are under the jurisdiction of the central/federal state according to both the structure established with the 1960 Nicosia Treaties and the system anticipated by the 2004 Annan Plan. The view that any behavior that would create tension and escalation should be avoided and, in this context, unilateral actions in the Eastern Mediterranean was conveyed to the UN Secretary General by the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community, but this failed to prevent the developments. GCA’s agreements with coastal states and giving licenses to international companies before the Cyprus negotiations ended created new areas of debate, while inciting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey to devise counter strategies. With agreements concluded between Turkey and TRNC, they underlined their continuing claims on both the disputed areas in the south of the Island (where the GCA issued licenses) as well as on the territory of the TRNC.

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17 For a detailed account of the regulations regarding the maritime jurisdiction areas in Eastern Mediterranean, see Sertaç Hami Başer (Ed.), *Doğu Akdeniz'de Hukuk ve Siyaset*, (Ankara: A.Ü. SBF Yay., 2013).


Table 3.1. Turkey-Greece Foreign Policy Crises (1923-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crises</th>
<th>Parties (Adversaries)</th>
<th>The Party Triggering The Crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-7 September 1955 Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964 Cyprus Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Republic of Cyprus</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 Cyprus Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)/Greece</td>
<td>Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)/Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 Cyprus Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)/Greece</td>
<td>Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)/Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 -1980 NOTAM Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1976 Aegean Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Limnos Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Western Thrace Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 Aegean Continental Shelf Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995 UNCLOS III-Parliamentary Declarations</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 Kardak/Imia Crisis</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 S-300 Missiles Crisis*</td>
<td>Turkey-Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)/Greece</td>
<td>Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)/Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 Syria-Öcalan Crisis**</td>
<td>Turkey-Greece</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Areas Crisis***</td>
<td>Turkey-Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)/Greece</td>
<td>Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)/Greece</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In the 1964, 1967, 1974 Cyprus crises, Greece had the status of a guarantor state. The 1997 S-300 Missiles Crisis occurred between GCA and Turkey. However, Greece became an indirect party to the crisis due to the Common Defence Doctrine signed with GCA and its status as a Guarantor state.

** In the 1998 Syria-Ocalan Crisis, the country targeted by Turkey was Syria. The support and protection offered to Öcalan by Greece, however, led Turkey to indirectly target Greece as well. Turkey declared that it could use its self-defence rights against Greece.

*** In the crisis on Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction areas, the crisis process is related to the maritime boundaries of Turkey with both Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
From the perspective of crisis management, the policy that the GCA tries to implement contains risks and delicate balances on both economic and political grounds. The *fait accompli* created a new area of dispute and crisis between the GCA and Turkey, acquiring a dimension that would further escalate the tension. Upon Turkey’s reaction, it declared its readiness to negotiate the disputed areas, although this carries the dispute to a different level. Since Turkey does not recognize the GCA, it stipulated for TRNC to join the negotiations as the interested party. This created an impasse, since GCA, in turn, does not want to accept TRNC as an interlocutor. In a situation where the parties do not consider the other as an interlocutor, the strategy of creating a *fait accompli* and the reprisal strategies of the Turkish side are implemented. These developments create obstacles with regard to the negotiations aimed at the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The debates over the energy sources in the Eastern Mediterranean, eventually, evolved into mutual confrontations and disrupted the advancement of the negotiations.\(^\text{20}\)

**Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Crisis Management Strategies**

The events that triggered the crises in the 50 year process are in fact directed towards the aim of *enosis* shared by both the Greek Cypriot Community and Greece. Even the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus with the 1960 Treaties was seen as a step towards this goal.\(^\text{21}\) As a result of the escalating attacks on the Island, motivated by the decision-makers of the Greek Cypriot Community and Greece, three crises erupted in 1963-1964, 1967 and 1974 whereby Turkey was required to intervene as a guarantor state. In the 1950-1960 period, Britain was seen as the major obstacle for enosis, while the Turkish Cypriot Community and Turkey took this place since 1960s. Turkey’s major priority and goal in these crises, in contrast, has been to prevent physical attacks directed at the existence of the Turkish Cypriot Community living on the Island and to protect their rights and status derived from the founding documents. During the first two crises (1963-1964 and 1967), Turkey solved the crisis


\(^{21}\) On the details of the debates and disagreements among the politicians of EOKA, Greece and Cyprus with regard to giving in to the settlement provided by the Zurich and London Treaties, see Druşotis, *Karanlık Yön*...,
by pursuing a strategy of coercive diplomacy, based on the international legitimacy that its guarantor state status provided. The proposals for a solution in the inter-communal negotiations that started after the crises failed to resolve the disputes. Upon the 1974 coup against President Makarios and the declaration of the Cyprus Hellenic Republic, Turkey declared that it would enforce its guarantor rights. When those responsible for the coup were supported by the military junta in Athens, Greece was burdened with responsibility for the coup on the Island. Turkey contacted Britain as the third guarantor party, but could not persuade Britain for a common intervention. In the end, Turkey decided to intervene alone and conducted a military intervention in Cyprus on July 20, 1974.

Table 3.2. Protracted Conflicts, Crises and Triggers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crises</th>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>The Nature of the Triggering Event</th>
<th>The Category of the Triggering Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-7 September 1955 Crisis</td>
<td>Violent attack towards the Greek minority</td>
<td>Violation of Treaty</td>
<td>Political – Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 - 1964 Cyprus Crisis</td>
<td>Violent physical attack towards Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>Violation of Status</td>
<td>Political - Humanitarian – Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 Cyprus Crisis</td>
<td>Violent physical attack towards Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>Violation of Status</td>
<td>Political - Humanitarian – Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 Cyprus Crisis</td>
<td>Coup against the government</td>
<td>Violation of Status</td>
<td>Political – Legal - Military – Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 -1975 NOTAM Crisis</td>
<td>Military security measures</td>
<td>Perception of [In]security</td>
<td>Military - Political – Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1976 Aegean Crisis</td>
<td>Issuing of licenses and seismic research</td>
<td>Fait Accompli</td>
<td>Political – Legal – Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Limnos Crisis</td>
<td>Armament of the islands</td>
<td>Violation of Status</td>
<td>Military - Political – Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1990 Western Thrace Crisis</td>
<td>Violent physical attacks against Turkish Minority</td>
<td>Violation of Status</td>
<td>Humanitarian - Political – Legal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 On this topic, see Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında...,* 2008.
Considered in terms of crisis management, the common features in all three crises are the moves by Greek and Greek Cypriot decision-makers towards the goal of enosis. Besides, the paramilitary organization EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston or National Organization of Greek Cypriot Fighters) / EOKA-B\(^23\) played an active and prominent role in each of these crises.\(^24\) Still, it is not quite possible to differentiate the actors

\(^23\) After 1971, EOKA was called as EOKA-B.

\(^24\) In all three crises, EOKA and Grivas appear to have played important role in the events that triggered the crisis. Greek Cypriot leaders reconsidering the period decades later have confirmed this by confessing that they had had difficulty in controlling the activities of Grivas and the EOKA/EOKA-B organization. It appears that, following the 1967 military coup, the Greek junta had increased their activities in the Island through EOKA, Greek Cypriot National Guards, and the officers in the Greek division deployed on the Island; and tried to eliminate the influence of Makarios. In the process, besides the attacks on the Turkish Cypriot
responsible for the crises as state or non-state actors. Years later, the leaders of the Greek Cypriot Community accused the EOKA and Georgios Grivas and tried to avoid from political responsibility. While the armed attacks were organized towards Turkish Cypriots in the first two crises, in the 1974 crisis, the target of the military coup was President Makarios, whose legitimacy was also questionable. The coup was followed by internal conflict within the Greek Cypriot community, as a severe struggle emerged with the pro-enosis coup supporters on the one side and those with troubled relations with the military junta in Greece, though still pro-enosis, on the other.

The “Akritas Plan” implemented in early 1960s by decision-makers in both Cyprus and Greece, who acted in collision in the idea of enosis, aimed at the suppression and extermination of the Turkish Cypriots, unless they could be assimilated. When the enosis supporters who acted together in the 1964 and 1967 crises, were divided with deep differences of opinion, Present Makarios turned into an obstacle for the junta in Greece. As Makarios had acquired greater popularity and prestige compared with the junta leaders in Greece, a coup was considered necessary for the twin goals of eliminating Makarios and achieving enosis. The coup that toppled Makarios on July 15, 1974 had provoked an internal conflict among the Greek Cypriot community, and the coup plotters did not want to provoke Turkey by attacking the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkish Cypriots were, however, worried deeply by the developments. Having experienced the 1964 and 1967 events, they felt threatened by the events and attempted to secure Turkey’s guarantee. Turkey’s initial inactivity, making no concrete moves until July 20, 1974 other than condemning the coup, had encouraged the coup plotters. Their expectations did not materialize, however, and Turkey’s military intervention on July 20, 1974 started an irreversible process in the Island.

**Cyprus Crises in the Cycle of Dispute-Crisis and Turkey’s Strategies of Intervention**

The 1960 treaties had established a status quo in Cyprus that was agreed upon by the interested parties. Instead of the island joining either Greece or Turkey and fostering its division among the parties, a new state was founded based on the principle of political equality among the two communities. Britain, Greece and Turkey had recognized and guaranteed community, Greek Cypriots who were not fond of EOKA activities were also targeted.
the territorial integrity of this state. At this point, decision-makers in Turkey had praised this solution as an example that would consolidate the friendship between Turkey and Greece, even arguing that this could lead to a Turkish-Greek federation. The consensus reached, however, did not last long. Inter-communal tensions were revived when Makarios attempted to amend the Constitution in 1963, excluding the Turkish community in the process.

When physical attacks on the Turkish community on the island started in December 1963, Turkey contacted the other guarantor states as well communicating directly with the leader of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios, in an effort to solve the points of disagreement. Turkey had already called for negotiations to resolve the disagreements arising among the leaders of the communities, long before the physical attacks on the Island, during Makarios’ official visit to Ankara on 22-26 November 1962.\(^{25}\) Turkey had also made clear that it would not allow unilateral changes to the status quo. The disruption of negotiations in the wake of the Bloody Christmas attacks and the resumption of armed strife led Turkish decision-makers to a difficult choice. Since no improvement had been achieved in political negotiations, Turkey started to consider military options in order to stop the attacks. Taking the national conditions of the time into consideration, this included various risks and difficulties for the decision-makers.

Article 4 of the Guarantee Agreement provided a legitimate ground for Turkey to intervene militarily in the Island, yet Turkey at that time lacked the infrastructure to conduct such an intervention, in terms of military preparation and capacity.\(^{26}\) Indeed, when the Turkish decision-makers of the time considered the option of military intervention, they concluded that with its limited capabilities, an intervention by the Turkish Armed Forces would have faced numerous difficulties. Moreover, although the military intervention option was supported domestically, it was not welcomed at the international level, particularly by the leaders of the communist-socialist bloc. Turkey was reminded of this bitter truth by the then President of the US Lyndon Johnson’s “Letter”. Until August 1964, Turkey responded to the ongoing clashes by sending its aircraft to perform low altitude flights over the Island, and directly bombing Greek Cypriot troops in early August, upon the resumption of physical assaults. Turkey’s deployment of the threat of dissuasive force, in strategic terms, enabled

\(^{25}\) On Makarios’ visit to Ankara and details of the meeting, see Turgut Tülümen, *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yay., 1998): 49-57.

Turkey to end the crisis while it helped reduce the level of violence
directed at the Turkish community by creating a deterrent effect.

The 1963-1964 crisis was in fact an example whereby the parties tested
each other and learned about crisis management. When inter-communal
clashes restarted in 1967, Turkish decision-makers once more encountered
the possibility of performing a military intervention in the Island. The fact
that preparations and equipment necessary for an intervention had not been
completed resurfaced. Decision-makers in Turkey decided that they could
manage the crisis by pursuing a strategy of coercive diplomacy, and they
preferred to use the threat of use of force instead of actually using force.
The US mediation apparently played a significant role in this crisis. As a
result of the shuttle diplomacy conducted by Cyrus Vance, Turkey
achieved its demands, and the assaults on the Turkish community were
stopped. Besides, the 20,000 Greek troops and heavy weaponry,
clandestinely sent to the Island by Greece in 1974 in collaboration with
Makarios, were also taken out of the Island upon Turkey’s pressure.\(^{27}\)

After the 1963-1964 and 1967 crises, seeing that they had limited
options in the face of the recurrent Cyprus crises, Turkish decision-makers
had focused on the military preparations required for a military
intervention. Until 1974, Turkish Armed Forces had mostly completed the
armament and training that would enable a successful amphibious
operation. These preparations facilitated Turkey’s military intervention in
Cyprus in July 1974, which was conducted with many fewer casualties
compared with the previous crises.\(^ {28}\)

Each of these three crises had occurred with different governments in
power. But the Cyprus issue was considered to be a “national cause”, and
the Cyprus policy pursued by governments were supported to a great
extent, particularly in 1967 and afterwards. With regard to crisis
management, Turkey is observed to have employed different strategies
in each case. In the first two crises, Turkey made use of coercive

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27 Andreas Papandreu recounts in his memoirs how the decision to send arms and
troops secretly to the Island were taken after 1960. For details, see Andreas
28 One of the factors that impacted on the success of Turkey’s military intervention
was the withdrawal from the Island of the Greek troops and weaponry, which had
been employed secretly in breach of the treaties. The heavy weaponry and
approximately 20,000 military personnel were raised as a topic in the negotiations
conducted by the US representative Vance, and a consensus was reached on the
withdrawal of these forces out of the Island. It could be contemplated that the
resistance to the military intervention in 1974 would have been much stronger had
these personnel and weaponry remained on the Island.
diplomacy. In the 1974 crisis, however, a different defensive strategy was preferred. By implementing the decision for military intervention, Turkey employed “the limited escalation strategy conducted alongside the deterrence of counter-escalation and the strategy of preventing the opponent to miscalculate and compelling it comply with its commitments”. When declaring its decision to intervene militarily, Turkey made clear that it was acting as a guarantor to restore the constitutional order in the Island. It declared that, in accordance with this, its forces would not open fire unless they were fired at. The target was the coup against Makarios conducted by the EOKA-B organization. But Turkey’s military intervention created a contradictory situation in the Island. While Makarios’ supporters unwillingly gave support to Turkey’s intervention, the supporters of the EOKA-B, the officers in the Greek garrison and the Greek soldier secretly employed on the Island, together with other enosis proponents fought against the intervention. Therefore, Turkey’s decision not to open fire unless being fired at did not work in practice, and Turkish forces engaged in a fight with the EOKA-B forces, the National Guard Forces of the Greek Cypriots and the Greek military division.

When the clashes began, attention was paid to keep these “limited”, and to prevent them from spreading outside Cyprus to the borderlands with Greece. In that sense, the foreign policy pursued by Turkey seems to conform with both the fulfilling of obligations of guarantorship and with the strategies of crisis management. During the crisis, Turkey obviously did not have the intention to spread the war by attacking Greece. In his memoirs, Orhan Birgit who was the Minister of Tourism as well as the government spokesperson in the 37th Government, recounts how they facilitated the overthrow of the junta in Greece by informing the anti-coup officers that they had no intention of attacking Greece. Prime Minister of the time, Bülent Ecevit showed his support for peace and cooperation by congratulating Karamanlis upon his return to the country and expressing his sincere wishes. All these represent clues as to the willingness of Turkey to avoid spreading and extending the war.

31 For details, see Kamuran Gürün, Bükreş-Paris-Atina Büyükelçilik Hatraları, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yay., 1994): 330-331.
Concluding Remarks

As recurrent crises occurring within a protracted conflict, the Aegean and Cyprus crises between Turkey and Greece may have been overcome, yet the conflict and the dispute as a whole remain unsolved until now. These areas of dispute, which constitute two topics with high significance in terms of basic values and priorities for both countries, need to be settled in a satisfactory way for the parties. Throughout the history of bilateral relations, disputes that remain unresolved have enabled the eruption of conflicts and crises. Particularly in the dispute regarding the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, the parties approach the issue within the framework of sovereign rights, territorial integrity and security. This, however, provides the basis for the parties to have resort to methods including military violence in their crisis management strategies.

Despite the erosive effect of the crises, the search for solutions to the essence of issues has been futile. In the context of the Cyprus dispute, the first concrete step toward solution was taken with the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, but this solution proved to be temporary and collapsed. The second concrete step was the Annan Plan in 2004. This attempt collapsed, however, with the refusal of the Greek Cypriot community. It is still doubtful that the inter-communal negotiations continuing since 2008 could result in a concrete and durable solution.

A similar point can be made regarding the disputes in the Aegean Sea. An unspoken moratorium that actually freezes the basic theses of the parties appears to be in effect since 1976. Although an indirect process of negotiations was started after 1999, no steps could be taken to provide an essential solution to the disputes.

As a consequence, the process of long-standing, recurrent and protracted conflict that has been characterizing the bilateral relations of Turkey and Greece since 1950 could be expected to continue in the short- and mid-term. The most concrete factor that would alter this process is Turkey’s accession into the EU as a full member, yet this option is far from realization due to various factors. Currently, the confidence building measures and dialogue attempts started in 1999 have created a process whereby disputes could be negotiated. It is obvious, however, that this will not be sufficient for reaching a solution to disputes/conflicts, and should be continued with concrete steps.